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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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                                               21 MC 101
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                                                08 CV 3719 (AKH)
      In Re: September 11 Litigation
                                                08 CV 3722 (AKH)
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                                                New York, N.Y.
                                                July 17, 2013
                                                10:05 a.m.
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     Before:
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                         HON. ALVIN K. HELLERSTEIN
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                                               District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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13
          and 7 World Trade Co.
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APPEARANCES (Cont'd) 1 2 RICHARD KIBBE & ORBE LLP Attorneys for Defendant Boeing Co. 3 BY: BRIAN S. FRASER, ESQ. 4 Also Present: John N. Lieber President 5 World Trade Center Properties, LLC 6 (Trial resumed) 7 THE COURT: Before we introduce Mr. Shavell, I was thinking about what we have learned the last few days from the 8 9 insurance experts, and I don't think I have a good 10 understanding of what Mr. Beach meant by "actual cash value." I think I know what both Mr. McKinley and Mr. Beach said about 11 12 depreciation, which is not an accounting term but merely an 13 estimated value of the reduced value of the building from the 14 time it was new to the time just before the catastrophe. But I have trouble in my mind putting together these two concepts. 15 And I wonder whether Mr. Podesta or Ms. Taylor, if you could 16 17 help me understand what Mr. Beach was saying. And I'll ask 18 Mr. Williamson to help me with what Mr. McKinley was saying. 19 MR. PODESTA: I think what Mr. Beach was saying was 20 not dramatically different from what Professor Shavell was 21 saying.

THE COURT: No, different, because, one is talking about insurance and the latter is talking about economics.

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MR. PODESTA: All right. Actual cash value is the recovery that you get under an insurance policy if you are not

rebuilding the building. Actual cash value has the meaning that's defined in the insurance policies. In most insurance policies, it is defined as replacement cost for the building as is with new materials, minus an allowance for depreciation. That depreciation is determined by the condition at the time of loss.

THE COURT: What is the minus taken from?

MR. PODESTA: The minus is taken from what it would cost to replace the building brand-new, the same building brand-new, with new materials. And say it would cost to replace — a particular structure is destroyed — \$1 million, brand-new, new material, same size, same design, everything the same, except of course you don't go out and find old bricks to put in your new building. That's replacement cost in the insurance sense.

Actual cash value in the insurance sense is, in most policies and I believe in the absence of a policy definition, replacement cost minus depreciation, that is, the depreciation that is in effect on the date of the loss. If the building was built, say, in 1995 and it had incurred depreciation such that the estimated value of the building was reduced by 10 percent, you would take \$1 million minus 10 percent depreciation equals \$900,000. Now, some policies, like the WilProp form and other policies without definition in broad evidence rule states, also indicate that actual cash value can never be less than the

market value that would be paid by willing buyer, willing seller.

But the basic concept of actual cash value is that you take -- it's a close cousin of replacement cost. You start out with replacement cost. You can't determine actual cash value unless you know what the replacement cost is. So you first estimate replacement cost, same building but new. And then you take a look, well, how old is the building, what is its condition. We're also looking at physical depreciation. And you say, all right, this building is worth 10 percent less. So you don't get a million, you get \$900,000, if you don't rebuild.

THE COURT: I understand. You take a building as it stood when it was new and you decline it by the percentage of depreciation, and take that same percentage and you apply it against the replacement cost.

MR. PODESTA: That's correct. You don't take the percentage of depreciation like you might take an IRS depreciation schedule.

THE COURT: It's different from accounting. It's different from tax. It's a rough percentage diminution in value of the building owing to wear and tear.

MR. PODESTA: But actual cash value basically drops out of the equation if you are rebuilding and you have a policy that provides for replacement cost, although actual cash value

may be the basis for advances during at judgment period.

THE COURT: Actual cash value would then be the equivalent of, what, market value, or cost or what?

MR. PODESTA: In some policies. But it's basically replacement cost minus an allowance for depreciation.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. McKinley said he doesn't think it is depreciation. I don't know what he meant by that. Do you understand what he meant by that? Maybe Mr. Williamson can help me understand.

MR. PODESTA: I think Mr. Williamson would better answer that. But my impression was what he was saying was he was switching to the accounting sense, and you don't figure depreciation on a schedule. You don't say this building was built in 1995, it's six years old, you take 3% off for each of the six years. You look at the actual condition of the building at the time of the loss. I think he described it as more like an appraisal than an accounting depreciation analysis.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Williamson.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Ms. Baglin will address it, your Honor.

MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, we will be offering, as we discussed yesterday -- it's actually admitted but we put together for your Honor Joint Exhibit 205. That is a Cambridge

Horizon report. And one of the books of that analysis is the actual cash value analysis, and it actually explains the depreciation method that was used here in differentiating actual cash value from replace cost.

THE COURT: Tell me what you understand.

MS. BAGLIN: What I understand is it is not an across the board, a single depreciation factor. I agree with Mr. Podesta that it's not a straight-line factor based on the useful life of the building. It is based on the useful life of the conditions of individual components of the building, your Honor. It recognizes that the passage of time itself may not create any additional depreciation if the component is well maintained and sound.

THE COURT: What do you mean by "component"?

MS. BAGLIN: Well, some components, for example, the concrete footings, the steel beams, they look at each individual component, just as the appraisal did, your Honor, in deciding what the replacement cost is. They look at, what would the cost be of each actual beam of steel, each actual system or mechanical equipment.

THE COURT: You moon a replacement cost?

MS. BAGLIN: Yes. It's done on a component-by-component basis. And then, in figuring depreciation, that's also done on a component-by-component basis, your Honor. If there are some components that may never

have to be replaced, like the concrete footing, that sort of thing. So even if your building is 20 years old, that's still essentially good as new, has very little depreciation. Other systems could depreciate more rapidly, for example, an air conditioning system. But they look at the condition of the building at the time of the loss. So if, for example, a brand-new air conditioning system had just been put in a year ago, then there isn't very much depreciation to that. If you put in a new one today —

THE COURT: So did they ask how much percentage decline in each of those components.

MS. BAGLIN: That's right. Some of them have very little or none. Some have more than that.

THE COURT: Then come to an aggregate.

MS. BAGLIN: Right. It is not a depreciation of the entire replacement of the building. It's done very specifically on a component-by-component basis and looking at the actual condition of that component at the time of the loss.

THE COURT: Thank you.

OK. Now I'm ready for Shavell.

MS. BAGLIN: That is in Joint Exhibit 205, which we'll be presenting later. It is already submitted in evidence.

MR. PODESTA: If I might add, your Honor, I basically agree with that. That's why the Cambridge Horizon report is like 2,000 pages long. They do every individual component.

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But they ultimately come up with a total. And actual cash
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      value wasn't much different from replacement cost in the case
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      of this building. A few percent.
               THE COURT: OK. Mr. Shavell.
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               MR. WILLIAMSON: Good morning, your Honor. Plaintiffs
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      call Professor Steven Shavell.
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               THE COURT: Pay attention to the oath, please.
               Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
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9
      nothing but truth, Mr. Shavell?
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               THE WITNESS: I do.
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               THE COURT: Thank you. Spell your name slowly for the
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      reporter.
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               THE WITNESS: My first name is Steven, with a V, and
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     my last name is Shavell, S-h-a-v as in victor, e-l-l.
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               THE COURT: No middle name.
               THE WITNESS: There is a middle name, Mark.
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               THE COURT: So Steven M. Shavell. Thank you,
     Mr. Shavell.
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               You may inquire, Mr. Williamson.
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               MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.
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       STEVEN M. SHAVELL,
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           called as a witness by the plaintiff,
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           having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
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      DIRECT EXAMINATION
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      BY MR. WILLIAMSON:
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- Good morning, Mr. Shavell. Please tell his Honor what your 1 2 profession is.
- 3 I am an economist and a professor.
- 4 Where do you work? Q.
- 5 Harvard Law School. Α.
- 6 What is your position at Harvard Law School? 0.
- 7 I'm a professor of law and economics. Α.
- 8 How long have you been at Harvard?
- 9 Since 1974. I was for six years in the department of 10 economics at Harvard and then in 1980 moved from the economics 11 faculty to Harvard Law School.
- 12 Would you please describe briefly for his Honor your 13 educational background.
  - A. I graduated from the University of Michigan in 1968, with a degree in mathematics and a degree in economics. And then from 1970 to '73 I was a graduate student at MIT in their Ph.D. economics program. I obtained a Ph.D.

THE COURT: With Professor Samuelson?

THE WITNESS: I did. I was his research assistant. even played tennis with him once. He's a good tennis player.

THE COURT: I didn't know that. I know he was the leading economist at the time I went to school and I read his textbook.

THE WITNESS: The same with me.

THE COURT: Sorry. Old people tend to reminisce.

Q. Can you summarize, please, briefly your employment history for Judge Hellerstein.

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- A. Yes. Between 1968 when I graduated from the University of Michigan and 1970, I was a first lieutenant in the public health service at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Then in my last year of graduate school I was an assistant professor in the economics department at Boston College. And then in 1974, as I said, I joined the department of economics at Harvard University, and I've been a professor at Harvard since then but with two stints as a visiting professor
- Q. Do you hold any other positions at Harvard Law School?
- 13 A. I am the director of what's called the center for law, 14 economics, and business.
  - Q. What is the nature of your teaching and research?

elsewhere over those years.

- A. Since moving to Harvard Law School it's been focused on legal issues. Of course if I were not interested in the law I wouldn't be at Harvard Law School. And the subject areas in which I'm interested are, they're subject areas of first-year law students, namely torts and insurance, contracts, property law, criminal law, and litigation and the legal process.
- Q. What are some of the courses that you teach at Harvard Law School?
  - A. Almost each one has the words "law and economics" in its title. One course is called economic analysis of law and it

Shavell - direct

- deals with the basic areas of law that I just described to you 1 2 but from an economic perspective.
- 3 Professor Shavell, have you written any books?
- Yes. 4 Α.
- 5 What books have you written?
- I've authored or coauthored four books, four scholarly 6 Α.
- 7 books, and one textbook.
- Could you give his Honor an example of one. 8
- 9 The first book I wrote by myself is called *Economic*
- 10 Analysis of Accident Law, and it deals with torts and
- 11 insurance.
- 12 Have you published any articles?
- 13 Α. Many.
- Roughly how many? 14 Q.
- 15 Α. Over a hundred, probably around 130.
- 16 0. On what subject?
- 17 THE COURT: I think I know the subjects. At some
- point, when it's convenient, you can offer him as a qualified 18
- 19 expert.
- 20 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor.
- 21 THE COURT: And I will agree.
- 22 MR. WILLIAMSON: Just briefly so that your Honor --
- THE COURT: I never like to cut anyone short in 23
- 24 hearing all of his qualifications. There are few places in
- 25 life where you can just sit and agree and not feel that you're

boasting.

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- Q. Have you received any honors or fellowships, just to briefly finish?
- A. Yes. A number of years ago I was awarded a Guggenheim fellowship. I was elected for membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Most recently, in May, it was announced I would be awarded what's called the Coase Medal for Scholarship in Law and Economics. And I will be, once I'm awarded the medal, the third recipient. The other two were
  - MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, I would like to ask to have Professor Shavell's curriculum vitae marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 565.
- MR. PODESTA: No objection.
- 15 THE COURT: Received.
- 16 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 565 received in evidence)

Judge Richard Posner and Judge Guido Calabresi.

- THE COURT: Do you offer Professor Shavell as an expert on economics?
- 19 MR. PODESTA: No objection. We will --
- 20 | THE COURT: He hasn't offered him.
- 21 MR. PODESTA: Oh, I'm sorry.
- 22 THE COURT: Mr. Williamson.
- 23 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Plaintiffs offer Professor
- 24 | Shavell as a qualified expert in the field of law and
- 25 | economics.

1 THE COURT: So ordered without objection.

MR. PODESTA: I do want to note, though, that we will have objections to the extent Professor Shavell gets into legal issues.

THE COURT: Of course you'll object.

MR. PODESTA: Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't need to be warned.

- Q. What's the nature of the assignment that you had in these cases, Professor Shavell?
- A. My assignment was to apply economic analysis in considering the possible correspondence between insurance payments received by the plaintiffs in this matter and tort damages that they might be awarded in the circumstances of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center complex.
- Q. So as an economist, what is the process, please tell his Honor, by which you conducted your analysis. What was your methodology?
- A. My methodology consisted of five elements: first, to identify categories of economic loss suffered by the plaintiffs; second, to identify the categories of insurance payments that the plaintiffs received; third, to identify categories of tort damages that they might be awarded; fourth, to line up in some sense the categories of insurance payments received with the categories of tort damages that might be awarded and to see if there is a correspondence between

Shavell - direct

- categories of insurance payments received and tort damages that 1
- 2 might be awarded. It's a kind of matching exercise. And then
- 3 fifth and last, to apply an economic test to the matching
- 4 exercise to the correspondence analysis to see if it's right by
- 5 means of asking the question do the correspondence conclusions
- 6 prevent windfalls to plaintiffs.
- 7 Now, Professor, did you reach a conclusion as to whether
- there is any possible correspondence for the main site? 8
- 9 Α. Yes.
- 10 What was that conclusion?
- 11 In general terms the conclusion was there is a potential
- 12 correspondence between insurance payments that might be deemed
- 13 to have been received for loss of rental income and tort
- 14 damages that might be awarded for loss of rental income, but no
- 15 correspondence between insurance payments that might be said to
- have been received for replacement costs and possible tort 16
- 17 damages.
- Q. So as a result of that conclusion, did you determine what 18
- 19 was the maximum possible correspondence consistent with the
- 20 conclusion you just stated?
- 21 Do you mean in dollar terms? Α.
- 22 Ο. Yes, I do.
- 23 I don't remember the exact number. It was between 6 and 7
- 24 hundred million, but we'll see it very shortly in a
- 25 demonstrative.

Did you prepare an exhibit summarizing that conclusion that

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- 2 you have stated?
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- A. Yes. That's what I meant by "demonstrative exhibit."
- MR. WILLIAMSON: Mr. McCleod, can you pull up the
- first slide, please.
- Your Honor, it will be a series of four slides. We'll offer them at the end. We've given them to counsel.
  - THE COURT: Why don't you offer them now.
  - MR. WILLIAMSON: Offer them now, yes, your Honor.
- Mr. Cohen will hand them up.
  - MR. COHEN: I'll hand up the first one.
- MR. WILLIAMSON: Do you want them marked separately or as a group, your Honor?
  - THE COURT: Mark them each separately.
- MR. WILLIAMSON: These would be in order: Plaintiff's Exhibit 566, 567, 568, and 569, the first two relating to the
- main site and the second two relating to 7 World Trade Center.
  - THE COURT: Why don't you describe each so the record will be clearer.
  - MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor. Plaintiff's Exhibit
- 21 566 is entitled "Maximum Possible Correspondence between WTCP's
- Insurance Recoveries and Potential Tort Damages." And Exhibit 22
- 23 567 is entitled "Insurance Recovery by WTCP and its Possible
- 24 Allocation." And Plaintiff's Exhibit 568 is entitled "Maximum
  - Possible Correspondence between 7 WTC Co. Insurance Recoveries

and Potential Tort Damages." And then the last --

THE COURT: So 568 and 566 are the same, covering different buildings. Same analysis, different buildings.

MR. WILLIAMSON: You're exactly right. Exactly right.

And then the last, similarly, parallels, one for the main site. It's Plaintiff's Exhibit 569. It's entitled "Insurance Recovery by 7 WTC Co. and its Possible Allocation." So those are the four. And we have up on the screen the first of the --

THE COURT: Mr. Cohen do you have another set for him?

MR. COHEN: Yes, I'll give him another set, sure.

- Q. So, Professor Shavell, you see the one that's on the screen
- 13 so we're all working from the same one? That's Plaintiff's
- 14 | Exhibit 566?
- 15 | A. Yes.

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- 16 Q. OK. So could you please explain to his Honor what this
- 17 | exhibit that you prepared shows in summarizing your analysis in
- 18 regard to maximum possible correspondence as to the main site.
- 19 A. Yes. On the left, your Honor, which I think you can see --
- THE COURT: Yes.
- 21 A. -- there is a bar representing insurance recoveries. The
- 22 | total is little over \$4 billion. I can, and will, elaborate on
- 23 how that number was arrived at. It's a net insurance recovery.
- 24 And then in the bar, you can see two colored parts. On the top
- is rental income loss recovery, and the figure is \$638,965,006,

replacement cost expenses.

which represents 15.8 percent of the total insurance recoveries. And again I'll explain how that breaks down, could be arrived at. And then, underneath it, is the replacement cost amount of insurance recovery that could be deemed to represent what plaintiffs received from their insurers for the

Then you can see an arrow going from rental income loss on the left under Insurance Recovery to the right, where there is a bar representing potential tort damages, which I am assuming can be for rental income loss but, since there's no bar there for replacement costs, that reflects my assumption that there cannot be tort damages for replacement cost.

So the possible correspondence, therefore, can only be between the rental income loss insurance recovery and tort damages for rental income losses.

THE COURT: Is the maximum possible correspondence figure of \$638,965,006 15.8 percent of \$2 billion 805 million? Is that how you get it?

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, it's 15.8 percent of the insurance recoveries, because on the left, the bar is supposed to represent the breakdown of the insurance recovery of the 4 billion.

THE COURT: I understand. I misread. I see it.

You're applying that.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: So in order to arrive at the same fraction to come to your figure of maximum possible correspondence, you then take 15.8 percent of \$2,805 million?

THE WITNESS: I do not, your Honor, because the -- let me step back for a second.

THE COURT: Let me withdraw the question and just ask you to explain, what's the answer to the arrow leading to the right?

leading to the right is that whatever the amount of tort damages might turn out to be for rental income losses, there can be a subtraction of up to the full amount of insurance proceeds for that same category, namely rental income loss. So, for example, if there were a tort award of a billion dollars for rental income loss, then there could be a set-off from that \$1 billion tort award of the entirety of the rental income recovery of \$638,965,006. But one couldn't subtract — the reason the word "maximum" is there is that one couldn't set off more than the insurance payment received for rental income loss from a tort award for rental income loss. One could only subtract the insurance payment deemed to have been received for rental income loss.

THE COURT: Whatever the tort recovery, deduct \$638 million. That's the maximum possible correspondence for the insurance.

B / III W I O I P O

THE WITNESS: That's what this is supposed to represent. Of course you can't go below zero. But with that proviso, yes.

THE COURT: OK.

THE WITNESS: So --

THE COURT: I think you can wait for the next question.

- Q. So in your analysis, what are the categories of loss suffered? You told us your methodology had that as your first step.
- A. Yes.

THE COURT: Loss suffered, what, from an economic standpoint?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, from an economic perspective, your Honor. Thank you.

- A. The two major categories of economic loss suffered by the plaintiffs due to the 9/11 attack were, in my opinion, replacement costs and rental income losses.
- Q. Following the second step in your methodology, you told us you examined the categories from the insurance president. What are the major categories of the insurance proceeds that you identified regarding the main site?
- A. The two major categories of insurance coverage were exactly the categories of economic loss that I just mentioned. The category of coverage for rental income loss, that might have

been called business interruption in most of the policies, and a category of coverage for replacement costs, which might have been described under the heading of property damage in many of

the policies.

- Q. With respect to the third step in your methodology, you told us that you looked to see what are the categories of potential tort damages that may be awarded. What did you assume in that regard?
- A. I assumed that one category of potential tort damages is for losses of rental income. And I assumed that replacement costs was not a category of potential tort damages.
- Q. Then the fourth step you told his Honor in your methodology was looking to see --

THE COURT: Have you finished your answer? The potential categories of tort recovery? Only losses of rental income?

THE WITNESS: My testimony, your Honor, is that I assumed — this is not an expert opinion, of course, because I'm not a legal expert — I assumed that a potential category of tort damages is rental income losses. I'm not assuming that there aren't other categories of tort damages. I remember, for example, reading that there might be tort damages for certain personal property losses. But I am assuming that damages for rental income losses constitutes a major category of potential tort damages.

THE COURT: What about the destruction of the asset that gives rise to the rental income? Does that count as a category of loss in a potential tort recovery?

THE WITNESS: Because I'm assuming that replacement cost expenses suffered by the plaintiffs are not a potential category of tort damages, I think the answer to your question is, I'm assuming that there can't be tort damages awarded to the plaintiffs for the property damage. My understanding is, the plaintiffs are not the owner of the property but, rather, of a leasehold interest.

THE COURT: A 99-year leasehold.

THE WITNESS: Correct, a 99-year leasehold interest.

So -- well --

THE COURT: So your testimony is that the loss of the total stream of rental income subsumes all other categories of -- withdrawn. So you're assuming that the loss of the total stream of rental income subsumes the loss of the asset giving rise to that income as well.

an assumption about what the loss of rental income subsumes.

I'm thinking of it in very simple, I think, in a straightforward fashion, that there is a stream of rental income that plaintiffs would have enjoyed if the towers had not been destroyed, and because of the terrorist attack of course the towers were destroyed, so this rental stream of income has

been interrupted. It will resume at some point as the towers are rebuilt. It already has resumed, I understand, for 7 World Trade Center. So that one component of the tort loss that I am imagining there might be an award for if there were a trial is the stream of rental income that turns out to have been lost by plaintiffs. Wholly separate from that is the cost of replacing the towers. And I have been told to assume that there cannot be a tort award for that contractual expense borne by plaintiffs.

So these are the assumptions that underlie my correspondence analysis. If the assumptions were changed of course the analysis might change. But those are my assumptions.

THE COURT: Continue, please.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you.

- Q. Now, with regard to the fourth step in your methodology you that told his Honor about, looking to see if there's lining up or a match in your correspondence analysis, what did you conclude with regard to the main site and how is that shown on this exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 566?
- A. Well, it's obvious from the visual display exactly how to line things up because there's only one category of potential tort damages, given my assumptions, and it's colored in green. So it's very easy to line it up with the same category of insurance payments. I'm not even sure I would call this part

- of the analysis. It's automatic in character.
- Now, the last step in your methodology you said was testing 2 Q. 3 the economic correctness, I believe?
- Α. Yes. 4

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5 Q. And would a windfall result -- withdrawn.

6 Did you test the economic correctness of this analysis 7 that's in Plaintiff's Exhibit 566?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Would a windfall result if the Court accepted your conclusion?
- 11 MR. PODESTA: Objection.
- Q. From an economic perspective? 12
- 13 THE COURT: Repeat the question, please. Rephrase it.
- 14 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor.
  - Q. From an economic perspective, would a windfall result if the Court accepted your conclusion from your analysis that's reflected on this exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 566?
- 18 MR. PODESTA: Objection.
- 19 THE COURT: Is "windfall" an economic concept?
- 20 THE WITNESS: I would say that "windfall" is not a 21 term used in the formal sense in economics. We all know what 22 it means, but we could use a synonym for it, which would be 23 "overcompensation." That would maybe avoid the problem here.
- 24 I'll allow an answer. If there were a THE COURT: 25 jury I might sustain an objection. But I will let the answer

be given.

A. The fifth and final step of my correspondence analysis is to check its correctness by asking myself the question --

THE COURT: Does it make sense.

A. -- does it make sense from the perspective of a particular economic test. And that test is, do my correspondence conclusions serve the purpose of preventing plaintiffs from receiving too much compensation for a loss for which they have been awarded tort damages. That is my assumption about what the economic purpose of the correspondence analysis is.

So here in this diagram, or in this exhibit, if -- the exhibit shows that there should be a set-off of as much as 638 million -- I'm not going to repeat the 965,000 each time, I'll call it 638 million -- the exhibit says 638 million of rental income recoveries should be subtracted from a tort award for rental income losses. This is correct from the point of view of my test.

And I would illustrate: Suppose that there is a tort award for a billion dollars. Clearly if a billion dollars were handed to plaintiffs in tort damages and they got to keep their 638 million in insurance payments, they would be overcompensated, they would enjoy a windfall, from the insurance payments, because they would have, in sum, not a billion dollars, which is by assumption their loss if the tort award is for a billion, but 1 billion 638 million. So this

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subtraction, which is what this diagram says should occur from tort damages of 638 million would leave plaintiffs with exactly the right amount, \$1 billion, to compensate them for lost rental income, because their tort award would be a billion minus 638 million, and that 638 million would be received from their insurer. So, in the end, they would be made whole but not more than that for their rental income loss.

But now let's look at --

THE COURT: I'm not following you. So they would come out net, the difference would be 638 and a billion, or roughly 360 million.

THE WITNESS: Correct, your Honor. They would come out with that amount in tort damages. But they would be retaining, of course, their insurance payments, the correspondence.

THE COURT: The payment of 6 hundred-some-odd million.

THE WITNESS: Right.

THE COURT: And they would have their net tort recovery from that policy.

THE WITNESS: Exactly right.

So as to that category of loss for which tort damages in this example have been awarded in the amount 1 billion, they would wind up, if you add their tort damages after the set-off to their insurance proceeds, with exactly the right amount.

> THE COURT: \$1 billion.

THE WITNESS: 1 billion, yes.

But with regard to replacement costs, the other program I test is to ask the question about each component of economic loss, is there a windfall occurring.

THE COURT: Do you understand that the amount of insurance recovery for lost income was the equivalent of the total income stream that 9/11 destroyed?

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, are you asking me a factual question?

THE COURT: Yes. An assumption in terms of your opinion. You did not, I know you did not investigate yourself.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: You only are responding to what was given to you to assume.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: So I'm asking, was one of the assumptions on which you're working the equivalence of the lost income stream for purposes of insurance and the lost income stream for purposes of economics? In other words, was there a time limit to the insurance recovery and no comparable time limit to the economic loss or potential tort recovery?

THE WITNESS: I think I understand your question. From an economic perspective, the lost rental income is not time-limited in nature. Potentially it could go on for 99 years, although --

THE COURT: That's the economic loss, related to the present value to that as well.

THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. But I do not assume that in fact the loss of rental income would go on for anything like 99 years, because it will end when new towers are constructed and are retenanted. So the loss will not in fact go on for more than 99 years.

THE COURT: So isn't that replacement cost another factor to be considered in relationship both to tort recovery and to economic loss? After all, if there were no replacement, the income stream would go on forever?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: But it's not going on forever because the building would be replaced.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Your Honor --

THE COURT: So how do you place an economic factor, in relationship to what costs to replace?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure if I'm going to be answering your question, but I think I am, by saying the following --

THE COURT: I think you are.

THE WITNESS: OK. You are making the correct observation that when the building is retenanted, when a tower is rebuilt and then it's retenanted, that the lost rental income will no longer be suffered. That is something that is

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built in to my thinking and analysis, although it's not always explicit or even relevant in some of these diagrams, but it's definitely something I'm taking into account. And one further comment about it is that, in my thinking, if a building is replaced in a certain year and retenanted a couple years later, the damages for lost rental income would reflect, would reflect that, because the damage -- I'm assuming that damages for lost rental income would be premised on actual lost rental income suffered. So if a suit in the future were brought and it was litigated, that the damage amount would be based on the period of time in fact during which rental income could not have been earned because of the absence of a building or because the building was new and hadn't yet been retenanted.

THE COURT: But don't you have to account economically for the cost that was entailed in maintaining the income street?

> THE WITNESS: Do you mean the operating costs? THE COURT: No. The cost of restoring the building so

The building was destroyed. At set producing income is destroyed. So your economic damages, you testified, is the lost income you suffered. But at a certain time the building can be rebuilt. And then you no longer suffer damages after There's no more a lost income stream also. that.

THE WITNESS: Correct.

you can keep getting income from it.

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THE COURT: So my question is, don't you have to account in some fashion for the cost of doing that, the cost of restoring your income stream?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Where is that shown on 566?

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, when I described the categories of economic loss, I said there were two replacement costs.

THE COURT: You said not to be counted.

THE WITNESS: Well, what I --

THE COURT: No, you're right. You said the potential tort recovery not to be counted.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: But economically it is a cost.

THE WITNESS: Yes, exactly.

THE COURT: I think I've got it. You can take over.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. McCleod, can you pull up the next slide, Plaintiff's Exhibit 567.

Q. His Honor asked you some questions, Professor Shavell, about where some of the numbers came from. Could you please explain to his Honor the source of any and your calculations for each of the numbers that are on the exhibit we were just looking at, Plaintiff's Exhibit 566. So now we have 567 up and I'd like you to explain it to his Honor.

MR. PODESTA: Your Honor, to simplify matters, we're prepared to stipulate to the math as done correctly here.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you but I'd like --

THE COURT: Thank you. I was really worried about that.

Go on, please.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you.

Q. Yes, Professor.

A. Your Honor, as you can see, the first heading is Net
Insurance Recovery, and the explanation of that is, first, that
the amount received from insurers was \$4.091 billion. I'm
rounding. That's a number that I know well. And then there
are three subtractions made to arrive at a net insurance
recovery. The first subtraction is for insurance premiums
paid, I believe in the two years preceding the 9/11 event, and
the first of those is \$5,898 thousand. And a bit more. Then
there's a second subtraction for claims preparation costs. And
there's a third subtraction for appraisal costs. When you make
these three subtractions, you arrive at the net insurance
recovery of \$4,044,082,315. And, your Honor, there are
footnotes here which document the source of all these figures.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with them from other documents. This is not original work. This is just, you're taking numbers from other aspects of this case and you're putting it all together for a handy chart.

THE WITNESS: Exactly.

- Q. How about the next item on Plaintiff's Exhibit 567, entitled "Possible Allocation of Net Insurance Recovery." Could you briefly walk his Honor through that.
- A. Yes. So your Honor, this refers to the possible allocation illustrated on the left side of that chart where I broke down the insurance recovery into two parts. So one possible insurance one of the two possible insurance recoveries was for lost rental income. And so now I'm going to explain and that amount was 638,965 thousand. So the question is, how did I obtain that number.

THE COURT: They're the same percentages you showed in the last chart.

THE WITNESS: Correct. So now I want to say where do those percentages come from. So what I did, because it's economically sensible, was, I examined the fraction of the total claims that plaintiffs presented to their insurers in their preliminary proofs of partial loss submissions, made up by claims for lost rental income, and in parentheses — actually I can see there's one part of a parenthesis missing but we'll ignore that. You can see the number 1,347 thousand — 1,347,805,679. That number is the claims made in this preliminary proof for rental income losses. The second number, the 8,531 million number, represents the total claims made in the preliminary proofs. So the ratio, or the

percentage of the first number relative to the sum, is 15.8 percent. Another way of putting that is something like one sixth of all the claims submitted by the plaintiffs to their insurers were for lost rental income.

So I applied that percentage to the actual total recovery, by allocating --

THE COURT: This has a breakdown of the bar on the left-hand side of the previous chart.

THE WITNESS: That's correct.

THE COURT: We've done the arithmetic. I think I understand that, understand that methodology.

What you did is, you take the preliminary proof of loss and you've created a proportion to the total of insurance recovery. 15.8 percent is roughly claimed for lost income and 84.2 percent is what was claimed after the appraisal for property that was valued on the basis of replacing costs.

THE WITNESS: Exactly right.

THE COURT: And you've come up with these numbers.

You came up with the numbers on the bar chart, the last

exhibit. OK. I think I understand that.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you.

Mr. McCleod, could you please put up Defendant's Exhibit 568.

THE COURT: One question. An appraisal supposedly shakes out the water in the application for replacement costs.

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There never was a replacement with regard to lost income. from an economic perspective, do you think there's potential for a fair amount of water in that claim?

THE WITNESS: I haven't examined --

THE COURT: It's not your area.

THE WITNESS: Well, it's my area, but it's in the my assignment.

THE COURT: Right.

THE WITNESS: However, I do remember, not the details, but I remember reading the expert report of Professor Vandell, who used actual data projections of rental income that World Trade Center Properties expected to earn on the original buildings, so what my approach would be if I were given that assignment would be to look at those figures, or figures computed in the same way, and to compare them to the submission for lost rental income.

THE COURT: You don't know if that represent -- if those figures by the other expert represented an actual study by him or whether they were given to him by the clients.

THE WITNESS: I believe that -- well, I don't want to speculate. I don't remember the entire basis of his calculation.

(Continued on next page)

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THE COURT: In any event, he's not an expert, he's not been given to us.

Go ahead, Mr. Williamson.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you.

## BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

- Q. Now turning to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 568 in evidence, did you conduct the same five-step analysis using your methodology with respect to 7 World Trade Company?
- Α. Yes.
- Please tell his Honor briefly: What conclusions did you reach with regard to 7 World Trade Company following that five-step methodology as to maximum possible correspondence? A. Your Honor, this display is a little more complicated than the other one, but there's no difference in the logic lying behind it. I first identified the categories of economic loss suffered by now 7 World Trade Center. There's a third category in addition to replacement costs and rental income loss, namely, personal property loss, that you can see on the left

under "Insurance Recovery." It's minor, under a million dollars, but since parties have discussed it, I thought I should pay attention to it in my analysis.

On the left, the bar represents, just like in the previous figure, insurance recoveries and the possible allocation or breakdown of insurance recoveries into their component parts. The total recovery for 7 World Trade Center

was significantly less than for the main site and, as shown here, it's 828,866,381. And, again, I can explain where that number came from.

Now, the question is what's the breakdown of this 828 million into categories of insurance payments, and that's shown in the bar below, the 828 million figure.

So, the first component of insurance payments is small, small by the standards of the numbers in this litigation, \$994,640. That's the amount that I'll explain could be allocated to personal property loss.

Below that is the much larger amount, comprising 70.37 percent of all insurance recoveries, and that amount is 583,273,272 for replacement cost recovery.

And then on the bottom we have 244,598,469 for rental income loss recovery, constituting 29.51 percent of recoveries.

And finally, with regard to correspondence, I again lined up categories of potential tort damages with the categories of insurance payments, and I found two types of potential correspondence — one being the rental income loss recovery, insurance recovery, on the left, and the possible rental income loss tort recovery on the right; and then the other between the personal property loss insurance recovery and a potential personal property loss tort award. And here, I hadn't said it, except as a comment earlier, but I am assuming — I did assume — in drawing up this exhibit that

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there may be a tort award for personal property loss. 1

So, this is a thumbnail sketch of this exhibit.

THE COURT: Other than personal property, this follows the same methodology as you did with the other topics exactly the same?

THE WITNESS: The whole methodology is the same. personal property doesn't change the methodology. It just means there's one more element.

THE COURT: I see, right.

BY MR. WILLIAMSON:

- Q. How many categories of economic loss did you identify,
- 12 Professor --
- 13 THE COURT: It's the same, isn't it, as the last one?
- 14 THE WITNESS: The logic of this is identical to the
- 15 logic that we discussed for the main site.
- 16 THE COURT: And with the exception of personal 17 property, everything else is the same, the numbers are 18 different but the categories are the same?
- 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor.
- 20 THE COURT: OK, I got it.
- 21 MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you.
- 22 Q. How many categories of economic loss did you identify in 23 your analysis with regard to 7 World Trade Company?
- 24 THE COURT: Three. He said it.
- 25 Why did you believe there were three separate --

THE COURT: You've gone through this. You've gone through this exactly. It's the same analysis. We don't need it. It's the same.

MR. WILLIAMSON: The next slide, please.

Thanks.

- Q. Calling your attention, Professor, to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 569 in evidence, please explain to the Court what this is and how it relates to what we just walked through with regard to the main site.
- A. Your Honor, this chart is a -- is a cousin to the other chart we saw, describing the main site and, perhaps I should say, how the net insurance recovery was determined -- slightly different from how the net insurance recovery was determined for the main site. I began --

THE COURT: It's got one more factor; that's all?
THE WITNESS: Correct, but it's added.

THE COURT: Yes, there was a bonus payment that came in here. IRI sued and settled for 11,936,584 in respect of the portion allocable to the 7 World Trade Center Company, and you deducted that -- added that, the insurance recovery --

THE WITNESS: I added that.

THE COURT: -- as part of the insurance recovery?

THE WITNESS: I added two other deductions, correct.

And then the second part of this table breaks down the net insurance recovery of 828 million into three parts. And

the logic of it is exactly the same as was the case in the main site. I looked at the total claims submitted in what was called the interim proofs of loss, and asked what proportion of the total claims were made up of claims for: First, personal property, and that proportion was below 1 percent, it was .12 percent; what proportion of the total claims submitted in these interim proofs were for replacement costs, and that percentage was 70.37 percent; and, finally, what percentage of the total claims were for rental income losses, and that percentage was 29.51 percent.

Then, your Honor, I applied those percentages to the net insurance recovery amount. So, for example, if we consider replacement cost, that category of recovery, I applied the percentage 70.37 to 828 million and obtained, after that multiplication, 583,273,272; in other words, that 583 million figure is 70.37 percent of the net insurance recovery. So, that's how I accomplished the breakdown.

Q. Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMSON: You can take it down. Thank you.

Q. Professor, if World Trade Center Properties, going back to
the main site for a second, were to receive compensation for
one of either replacement costs or lost rent but not both,
would it be made whole?

A. No.

Q. Why not?

A. I think it's essentially obvious, because my belief is that they suffered two different losses, namely, that they couldn't make money from renting properties that no longer existed, and that they had to spend money to reconstruct towers. If they received compensation for only one of those categories of loss, how could they possibly be made whole? If they received money only for the rental income that they had to forego, they would have a multibillion-dollar expense that would be uncompensated associated with their obligation to rebuild World Trade Center towers.

On the other hand, if they were to receive compensation, in your hypothetical, for the cost of replacing the towers but nothing for the income loss, they would again be suffering a multibillion dollar loss because a lot of money would have been made for the -- from the World Trade Center properties over the period between 2001 and whenever they turn out to be fully retenanted.

Q. Do you know, Professor, whether from 9/11/2001 to today the World Trade Center properties have been able to collect any rental income from the properties of the main site?

THE COURT: I'm not sure that's relevant.

MR. PODESTA: Objection; outside the scope.

THE COURT: Sustained.

Q. Let me ask you a hypothetical, Professor. Assume that a property owner of a home with a market value of \$100,000

- suffers a total loss from a fire. The replacement value is \$150,000. What amount would be required to make that property owner whole?
- A. If the homeowner didn't attach special idiosyncratic value to his or her particular home, then \$100,000 would be sufficient to compensate the homeowner because that by assumption, the market value of the house is \$100,000, so the homeowner could buy an essentially equivalent house for \$100,000 and be just as happy.
- Q. Let me change the hypothetical in one way. The property owner now in this hypothetical has a contractual obligation to replace his home. What amount would be required to make him or her whole?
  - MR. PODESTA: Objection.
  - THE COURT: Overruled.
- 16 A. If the assumption is that the homeowner has a contractual
  17 obligation to rebuild --
- 18 | O. Yes.
  - A. the home that burned down, and the assumption is that it cost \$150,000 to do that, then the homeowner would have to be given, to make him whole, obviously 150,000 in order to compensate him for the replacement cost. And then, in addition, the homeowner would have to be given compensation for rental expenses during the time that the home is being rebuilt, on the assumption that it's going to take some months or longer

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than that to rebuild a destroyed home. The homeowner has to live someplace.

So, there would be two components of economic loss for the homeowner, the replacement cost and the cost of renting some substitute property during construction.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, Professor.

No further questions, your Honor.

THE COURT: Cross-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. PODESTA:

- Good morning, Professor.
- 12 Good morning, Mr. Podesta.
  - I'd like to explore first some of the economic principles 0. and see if we can reach agreement on them, and then I'd like to turn to some of the assumptions in your report, and finally to the allocation methodology that you propose.

Isn't it correct, Professor, that plaintiffs' business income, lost rental income insurance, only provided them with coverage for the period their destroyed buildings were being rebuilt and retenanted?

- I don't know or don't recall the details of the policies, but normally a business interruption coverage would be limited in time.
- Isn't it correct -- do you agree with me then that plaintiffs' business interruption rental income coverage

doesn't cover the full term of their leasehold? 1 2 THE COURT: Keep your voice up, Mr. Podesta, please. 3 MR. PODESTA: OK. 4 THE WITNESS: Mr. Podesta, since I don't -- since I 5 don't know the terms of the policies --6 THE COURT: Let me give you that to assume, let me 7 give you that to assume. In this case the business interruption insurance covered a limited term and not the full 8 9 term of the leasehold. 10 THE WITNESS: If I'm asked to assume that's true, 11 which wouldn't surprise me, because typically --12 THE COURT: Now Mr. Podesta is going to give you a 13 question. 14 THE WITNESS: OK. If plaintiffs' leasehold interest in the complex and WTC 7 15 Ο. were profitable rental income-generating properties before 16 17 9/11 --18 THE COURT: You need to speak up. 19 MR. PODESTA: I'm sorry. 20 If plaintiffs' leasehold interest in the complex and WTC 7 21 were profitable rental income-generating businesses before 22 9/11, wouldn't that rental income-generating capacity have been 23 reflected in their pre-9/11 market values?

A. As an economist, Mr. Podesta, I would assume that potential

profits from the operation of the property, commercial property

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would be reflected in market value but not necessarily perfectly because, among other things, some business enterprises that manage commercial properties are better than So, if a very efficient and savvy enterprise manages a property, it might be able to make a lot more money than others bidding for the property, who might bid for the property, would be able to make.

Isn't the rental income-generating capacity of commercial property a major factor into the determination of its fair market value?

> MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I would say yes.

- Q. And turning back to the complex in WTC 7, wouldn't the destruction of their revenue-generating capacity in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 be reflected in the post-9/11 market value of the leasehold interest?
- I'm hesitating in my answer, but I'll answer you.

THE COURT: Do you understand the question? quess the question. Would you like the question put back to you?

THE WITNESS: No, I remember the question.

The leasehold interest includes -- I'm assuming because I examined the lease, not the whole lease but crucial parts of the lease for my purposes -- it includes the

- 1 provision, according to my understanding, that requires the
- 2 | leaseholder to rebuild 7 World Trade Center if it's destroyed.
- 3 Now, after 9/11, anybody who owned that leasehold would,
- 4 according to my understanding, have that obligation. And that
- 5 obligation would dramatically reduce the market value of the
- 6 | leasehold.

- 7 Q. Are you espousing Professor Vandell's view that the WTCP
- 8 | leasehold had a negative market value after 9/11?
  - THE COURT: It's not in evidence. It only will confuse me.
- 11 MR. PODESTA: All right.
- 12 | Q. Do you agree, Professor, that reduction in fair market
- 13 | value is an accepted method of measuring the economic loss
- 14 resulting from the destruction of commercial property?
- 15 A. Could you repeat the question, please?
- 16 Q. Do you agree, Professor, that reduction in fair market
- 17 | value is an accepted method of measuring the economic loss
- 18 resulting from the destruction of commercial property?
- 19 A. It is -- I don't agree that it is always an acceptable or
- 20 accepted method. It might be.
- 21 | Q. Do you agree that replacement cost is an accepted method of
- 22 measuring the economic loss resulting from the destruction of
- 23 | commercial property?
- 24 A. My answer is the same. It might be, depending on the
- 25 circumstances.

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- Are there circumstances when compensation for a replacement of its destroyed property should consist of more than the physical cost of reconstruction?
- An example in which I think that might be true would be one in which it takes a very long time to replace a destroyed property. And to take an extreme example, suppose you could reconstruct a property for a dollar but it would take a hundred years to accomplish the reconstruction, then if you awarded the party a dollar or even the dollar discounted by a hundred years, which is to say almost nothing, that would not be adequate compensation because the person would not be enjoying whatever the benefits of having that structure would be for a hundred years.
- Q. Well, in the case of commercial rental property, Professor, should compensation for replacement cost include not only the cost of reconstruction but also rental income lost during the period before the property is fully rebuilt and restored to operations?
- If I understand your question, Mr. Podesta, you're asking me should compensation for replacement cost include compensation for lost rental income during the period before replacement is accomplished. Did I understand your question?
- 23 0. I believe that's correct.
  - I think the answer is no, because, in my mind, replacement cost means, in a literal sense, the expenses of reconstruction.

Now, it is true that accompanying reconstruction there might be 1

- 2 a period during which income or some other benefit will be
- 3 foregone. I would put that under a different heading because
- it's different. It wouldn't subsume it under the heading 4
- 5 "replacement cost."
- 6 Q. You agree the property owner should receive that
- 7 compensation but you wouldn't call it replacement cost?
- Correct; in order to be made whole, the property owner 8
- 9 would have to receive it.
- 10 Are you familiar with the so-called "lesser of two" rule
- 11 under which a property owner whose property has been damaged or
- 12 destroyed may recover as tort damages the lesser of the
- 13 property's diminution in market value or its replacement cost?
- 14 A. When you say am I familiar with the rule, I am familiar
- 15 with it in the sense that I've read about it and I've heard
- testimony about it; for example, yesterday. 16
- 17 As an economist, do you accept the premise of the "lesser
- 18 of two" rule, that the lesser of replacement cost or diminution
- 19 in market value affords full compensation to the owner of
- 20 damaged or destroyed property?
- 21 A. As an economist and as -- the question that -- one of the
- 22 questions that Mr. Williamson put to me illustrates the example
- 23 of the homeowner whose house was burned down, where the market
- 24 value of the house was \$100,000 and replacement cost was
- 25 I fully agree, from an economic perspective, with

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the "lesser of two" rule under the assumptions of that example in which the party who suffers the property loss has an option, a choice, between whether to replace or buy an equivalent property. So, given those assumptions, yes, I agree with it as a matter of logic.

Q. Now, let me just explore for a few minutes the assumptions underlying your opinion. And I'd like to have marked as -- I'd like to have shown as the next exhibit your complex report.

THE COURT: Are you going to impeach?

MR. PODESTA: Yes. I'm not offering this as affirmative evidence. I'm going to use it to impeach and to clarify the assumptions on which his opinion is based.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor; no other expert witness --

THE COURT: Let's wait for the question, Mr. Williamson.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Object to the use of the expert report and --

THE COURT: He can do anything you want. He can mark any piece of paper he wants. It's not in evidence.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Object to cross-examination based on the expert reports.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. PODESTA: Mr. Campbell, would you put JX 52 on the screen.

1 THE COURT: No, no. MR. PODESTA: What? 2 3 THE COURT: It's not in evidence. 4 MR. PODESTA: I just want --THE COURT: It's not in evidence. 5 BY MR. PODESTA: 6 7 Q. Did your opinion assume, Professor, that the tort damages allowed by the Court expressly exclude replacement costs on 8 9 legal grounds? 10 THE COURT: Excuse me. 11 (Pause) 12 THE COURT: By the opinion, you mean as he testified 13 here? 14 MR. PODESTA: Yes. 15 THE COURT: OK. Did your opinion, as you expressed it here, assume that the tort damages allowed by the Court 16 17 expressly excluded replacement costs on legal grounds? The 18 answer is yes or no or I don't know. 19 THE WITNESS: Yes. 20 BY MR. PODESTA: 21 Q. And doesn't your opinion also assume that under the Court's 22 legal rulings WTCP plaintiffs may not recover as tort damages 23 even a single dollar for replacement costs?

THE COURT: He just said that.

MR. PODESTA: OK.

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- Q. Doesn't your opinion also assume that under the Court's legal rulings the plaintiffs may not recover replacement costs even if they are proven to be less than the reduction in fair market value of the property?
  - MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor.
- THE COURT: Sustained.
  - Q. Doesn't your opinion also assume that insurance proceeds for replacement costs can be subtracted from a tort award only if that tort award is for replacement costs?
    - MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor.
- 11 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 12 Q. I'd like to refer you to paragraph 22 of your report,
  13 Professor.
- 14 THE COURT: Objection sustained.
  - Q. Doesn't the logic of your opinion rest on your conclusion that replacement cost insurance payments can only be subtracted from a tort award if that tort award is for replacement costs?
- 18 MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor.
- 19 THE COURT: Sustained.
- Q. Isn't your assumption that WTCP has been denied all right
  to recover replacement costs based on the Court's ruling in its
  December 2008 opinion that WTCP is not entitled to recover
  replacement costs on the basis of its contractual obligation to
  rebuild?
- MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained. 1 Is it one of the assumptions of your opinion, Professor, 2 3 that the aviation defendants are legally responsible for the damages allegedly arising out of WTCP's contractual obligation 4 5 to rebuild? 6 Objection, your Honor. MR. WILLIAMSON: 7 THE COURT: Sustained. MR. PODESTA: May I offer up the report to show that 8 9 he stated these were his assumptions in his report? 10 MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Sustained. 12 You can get the report back, Mr. Podesta. 13 Q. Am I correct in understanding that the reason why you 14 believe recovery of -- do you believe that recovery of the 15 reduction in fair market value of WTCP's net leasehold interests would be adequate compensation for this case, in this 16 17 case? 18 MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection, your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. 19 20 THE WITNESS: If you define fair market -- if you define fair market value to be what would be paid for the right 21 22 to collect rental income --23 THE COURT: I'll give you a definition of fair market

place, would sell for and what a willing buyer would buy for.

It's what a willing seller, at a certain time and

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THE WITNESS: That's a fine definition of fair market value.

MR. PODESTA: And I accept that for purposes of my question.

THE COURT: The question is: Would a reduction in that fair market value be adequate compensation, from an economic perspective?

THE WITNESS: Yes, I understand the question.

THE COURT: What's your answer?

THE WITNESS: My answer depends on what it is that you are imagining is for sale. Is it what I would call the --

THE COURT: A 99-year leasehold to a certain parcel of real estate that has been commercially developed.

THE WITNESS: That's not a complete definition for me, because what I want to know is, does the leasehold include the obligation to replace the destroyed property?

BY MR. PODESTA:

- Q. Let me rephrase the question then, Professor. Let me ask you to assume that WTCP had no obligation to rebuild the WTCP complex. Let's take the contractual obligation to rebuild out of the equation. Do you understand me, Professor?
- A. Yes, I do.
  - On that assumption -- contractual obligation to rebuild is out of the equation -- would the recovery by WTCP of the full reduction in value of its leasehold interest resulting from the

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9/11 terrorist attacks provide it with adequate compensation for its economic loss?

- Not necessarily. Α.
- And please explain why not. Q.
- The reason is twofold: First, if the receipt of fair market value would not allow the person with that money to buy a truly equivalent property for that person's purposes, then the person would not be able to, by that assumption, necessarily restore the income flow. So, if we're thinking of the World Trade Center Properties, which are distinctive, and a person were given this fair market value, would this person be able to quickly buy an equivalent property, that's a big -that's a real question.

Second, an independent reason for thinking that fair market value might not compensate for the economic loss is what I mentioned earlier, that some parties are able to make more money from operating, from their operations, than others. the fair market value is going to be determined by people who are not the present owners of the property but by other In some circumstances, in many circumstances, the fair market value will approximate what the operators might have made, but in other circumstances that will not be true.

My last comment is, after all, there are large differences in the abilities of companies to make money from their operations.

Q. Now, you mentioned --

THE COURT: In general, given the market, if someone pays a billion dollars for real estate for the opportunity to obtain a stream of income over a long period of time and that economic value is entirely destroyed, would the price paid, assuming that is the market, be full and fair compensation, from an economic perspective, in general?

THE WITNESS: I think, in general, it's a floor. And in many instances it might be the right amount to give because even though it might be understood that the party might have lost more money, there may not much evidence that could be obtained practically, in which case --

THE COURT: But if you have an auction, and that's the price established in the market, replenishing what the party paid at auction would be full and fair compensation, would it not?

THE WITNESS: I don't believe it would necessarily be.

THE COURT: Because some people are better and some people are worse, some people make money, some people lose money?

THE WITNESS: Right. I would look at the number.

THE COURT: In general, it means you average all this out and you have an auction market, a sloppy person would bid less, a person who could make a profit would bid more, but an auction rules this out, right? That's the purpose of an

auction?

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THE WITNESS: I think the purpose of an auction is to smoke out the individuals who are willing to bid the most, who are probably the savviest, but if there are not a lot of participants in an auction, how --

THE COURT: It may be an imperfect auction. have a Rembrandt and we have two people bidding, it's not as good an auction as if you have 15 people bidding?

THE WITNESS: Exactly.

THE COURT: But if you have an auction and you take a price, is that the market price?

THE WITNESS: I would definitely call it the market price.

THE COURT: And if you lose the market price and want to go out on the market and buy properties that will give you the same kind of return, that would be the market price and that would be the ability to replenish the market price, would it not?

THE WITNESS: It would. But, again, as I mentioned, it takes time, depending on the circumstances, to find roughly equivalent properties. And when you're talking --

THE COURT: That's the purpose of the time value of money?

THE WITNESS: It's not just the time value of money, your Honor. It's the -- well, I guess it's the central purpose Shavell - cross

- of the time value of money. 1
- I think we exhausted that topic. 2 THE COURT: Right.
- 3 I'd like to direct your attention to Exhibit 566.
  - THE COURT: Please put it up. Somebody?
- 5 MR. PODESTA: I'm sorry, I don't know your name.
- 6 MR. COHEN: Mr. McLeod.
- 7 THE COURT: It's up.
- Q. Now, I'd like to explore with you for a moment what WTCP's 8
- 9 total recovery from insurance payments and tort damages would
- 10 be if your proposed method of allocation were applied, and from
- 11 your own Exhibit 566, all right?
- 12 A. Yes.

- 13 THE COURT: We'll explore the box at the right?
- 14 MR. PODESTA: Yes.
- 15 THE COURT: The box at the right, "Potential Tort
- Damages"? 16
- 17 MR. PODESTA: Well, I can start on the right --
- 18 THE COURT: What do you want to do? I didn't hear
- 19 you.
- 20 MR. PODESTA: I want to started first on the left.
- 21 THE COURT: OK.
- 22 BY MR. PODESTA:
- 23 Q. Am I correct that under your analysis WTCP receives
- 24 insurance recoveries of some 4.044 billion?
- 25 Α. Correct.

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- And am I correct that WTCP also would receive a tort recovery before the setoff of 2.805 billion?
- A. Not necessarily.

THE COURT: Potentially?

MR. PODESTA: Potentially.

THE WITNESS: Potentially, the assumption is that it could receive as much as that.

THE COURT: That's what potentially means, yes.

That's potentially. 0.

So, the maximum potential recovery, before the offset, for the insurance offset, is you add the two numbers, 4044 and 2805 can you get \$6.849 billion; isn't that correct?

- I believe your math is correct. Α.
- Q. And you would subtract from that potentially \$639 million?

THE COURT: I don't think we're profiting by these arithmetical exercises.

- Q. But basically the point I want to make is, under your analysis, WTCP's total recovery, after offsets, would be about \$6.3 billion?
- MR. WILLIAMSON: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled. I can take judicial notice of that.

- Which is more than double its potential tort damages?
- 24 Α. Are you asking me to agree --

25 THE COURT: No; objection sustained.

- -- with your numbers? Α.
- Now, I'd like to -- is it your assumption that -- well, let 2 Ο.
- 3 me give you a hypothetical, sir. Let me ask you to assume that
- the WTC 7 case were tried to a jury and that the jury 4
- 5 awarded -- found that the replacement cost for the property was
- 6 \$736 million, and that the fair market value of the property
- 7 was \$737 million, and that the Court, applying the "lesser of
- two" rule, determined that the damages award should be 8
- 9 \$736 million.
  - Are you following me?
- 11 MR. WILLIAMSON: I will object whenever the question
- 12 ends, your Honor. I don't know if it's done.
- 13 THE COURT: The question is, "Are you following me?"
- 14 That's not an objectionable question.
- 15 MR. WILLIAMSON: Understood.
- THE WITNESS: Let me make sure, Mr. Podesta. You're 16
- 17 saying --
- THE COURT: No, don't repeat. What is the question, 18
- Mr. Podesta? 19
- 20 Q. Basically what I'm asking is if under his theory of
- allocation if replacement costs set the measure of damages, 21
- 22 would he allow replacement cost insurance recoveries to
- 23 correspond to the tort award and reduce the amount of damages?
- 24 THE COURT: Sustained.
- 25 MR. PODESTA: Can you give me a moment?

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THE COURT: Of course.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. PODESTA: Just one more question.

- You mentioned the contractual obligation to rebuild. You yourself are just simply assuming a contractual obligation to
- 6 rebuild; isn't that correct?
- 7 I'm assuming a contractual obligation to rebuild because
- counsel told me to assume that, but I also, as I mentioned, 8
- 9 looked at parts of the lease and I examined the part of the
- 10 lease describing the obligation. And I independently, even
- 11 though I'm not an expert on leases, read that clause as
- 12 amounting to an obligation to rebuild.
- 13 You're not a lawyer, are you, sir? 0.
- 14 I am not a lawyer. Α.
- 15 You haven't studied the whole lease? Q.
- 16 Α. Beg your pardon?
- 17 THE COURT: Mr. Podesta, let's not go there.
- 18 MR. PODESTA: OK. All right, fair enough. I have no 19 further questions.
- 20 THE COURT: Mr. Williamson?
- 21 MR. WILLIAMSON: No further questions, your Honor, 22 thank you very much.
- 23 THE COURT: I have a few questions.
- 24 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor.
- 25 THE COURT: In terms of economic loss, you value

everything that a person loses, do you not? 1 2 THE WITNESS: You would try. Sometimes you're not 3 able to do. 4 THE COURT: You can't do more than try; you use best 5 efforts. 6 So, if a person is under an obligation to rebuild, 7 that's part of that person's economic cost? THE WITNESS: Correct. 8 9 THE COURT: If he has to rebuild, that's his cost? 10 THE WITNESS: Correct. 11 THE COURT: If he doesn't have to rebuild, it's not 12 his cost? 13 THE WITNESS: Correct. 14 THE COURT: So, if a person has a valuable piece of 15 property that is worth, let's say, a billion dollars and it's destroyed and there's no obligation to rebuild, what would 16 17 fully compensate that person for his loss? 18 THE WITNESS: Are you saying that the property was worth a billion dollars? 19 20 THE COURT: A billion dollars. And it's destroyed. THE WITNESS: I would say that if the person could buy 21 22 an equivalent property and let's say there would be no 23 significant issue of waiting time locating the equivalent

property, then he could buy the equivalent property for a

billion, then a billion dollars would fully compensate the

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person.

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THE COURT: And let me ask you to assume that these other factors do not play in what courts do and just measure the economic loss of the property, a billion dollars would be full compensation, would it not?

THE WITNESS: It would seem so, yes, under those --THE COURT: So, let's say instead of losing a building, instead of losing an asset, the person suffering the loss loses a stream of income, which on the market auction would be worth a billion dollars. Would a billion dollars provide full compensation for that loss?

THE WITNESS: It would, almost by definition.

THE COURT: Now, let's suppose the person wants to receive -- to stay in that property and buys insurance to help him stay, and it would take two years to restore fully the income stream he lost and there would be a cost to restore that income stream, would the cost be a factor in economic measurement?

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, when you say cost, are you referring to the replacement cost of the building?

THE COURT: Yes, the cost to restore the income stream. That would have to be accounted for in some degree?

THE WITNESS: In full measure.

THE COURT: In full measure, even better.

And an economist would have to value that?

1 THE WITNESS: Absolutely. THE COURT: So, if you have an income stream lasting, 2 3 let's say, 30 years and you recover two years of lost income, 4 in order to restore the balance of 28, you incur a cost to 5 replace the income-producing quality of that property. Does an 6 accountant and an economist have to value that cost? 7 THE WITNESS: I don't really know what accountants do, 8 but. --9 THE COURT: An economist. 10 THE WITNESS: An economist, of course, would attempt 11 to measure all economically relevant factors. And how could a 12 cost of replacing a building in order to restorer stream not be 13 relevant? It is relevant. 14 THE COURT: It seems simple. 15 So, we have in this case lost income insurance. And I 16 will ask you to assume that lasts a certain period of time --17 THE WITNESS: Yes. 18 THE COURT: -- let us say two years. 19 THE WITNESS: OK. 20 THE COURT: It could be anything, but let us say two 21 years, but considerably less in duration than the lost income 22 stream that was destroyed. I will ask you to assume that. 23 THE WITNESS: OK.

the income stream, so that after two years it becomes as full

THE COURT: And there is a cost incurred to restore

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as it was before.

THE WITNESS: Understood.

THE COURT: We call that replacement cost.

Would that replacement cost have to be valued in terms of valuing the lost income stream?

THE WITNESS: Well, the lost income stream is one factor. The replacement cost is another factor. I don't quite know what you mean by -- in valuing the lost income -- the lost income stream is one number, and the replacement cost is another number because there's a connection between those two numbers.

THE COURT: What is the connection?

THE WITNESS: Well, the connection is that you can't begin to enjoy an interrupted income stream unless you fork out the money for replacement.

THE COURT: Exactly, exactly.

THE WITNESS: So, that's the connection, but the two numbers are different.

THE COURT: So, if your economic damages is the loss of the total income stream and you replace a small part of it with insurance, and you have to spend money to replace the total stream, you would have to, would you not, account for the cost of restoring the full income stream?

THE WITNESS: One would, but I don't quite understand, when you say you have to account for the replacement cost, who

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the "you" is. If you're asking me how would I --

THE COURT: The guy who lost the property, the guy who lost the property because of some negligent outside force.

THE WITNESS: If you're asking me what is the economic loss, setting aside issues of what a tort award might be and what insurance payments might be, just what is the economic loss -- and abstracting from these other issues -- suffered by a party whose building is destroyed and who then rebuilds it and restores at some point his income stream, my answer is I think the commonsense answer -- it's also the answer of economics -- that the loss involves a comparison of the situation that would have obtained, which is in the absence of the destruction of the property, which is to say the owner would have enjoyed an uninterrupted income stream for -- you're saying, 30 years, something like that?

THE COURT: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Now, given that there has been destruction of the property and replacement, the party's situation is different. The party has an income stream for only some of the 30 years, only for the period after the construction of the replacement property. So he has --

THE COURT: After the destruction but before the replacement?

THE WITNESS: Well, that's the period when there's no income, so, he's worse off there.

1	THE COURT: Yes, he loses that two years of income
2	stream?
3	THE WITNESS: Yes.
4	THE COURT: And he gets business interruption
5	insurance to replace that?
6	THE WITNESS: Well, I'm leaving insurance out of the
7	picture right now because I'm
8	THE COURT: I'm trying to get it in. And since I'm
9	the questioner, I've got the right.
10	THE WITNESS: So, I will answer your question but I'll
11	say to you first that
12	THE COURT: The power of a judge it's wonderful.
13	THE WITNESS: in the absence of insurance, this
14	person has lost two years of rental income and he's also spent
15	money on replacement cost.
16	THE COURT: Those are two parts of his economic loss?
17	THE WITNESS: Right.
18	THE COURT: And that's what you said in your
19	testimony?
20	THE WITNESS: Yes. And I think that's common sense.
21	THE COURT: So, when we get business interruption
22	insurance and we say that it corresponds to lost income, isn't
23	it the fact that it corresponds only to a section of the lost
24	income?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

THE COURT: And if we say that we have to factor in 1 the cost of restoring that entire income stream, shouldn't 2 3 there be a correspondence between that cost and the full tort 4 recovery? 5 THE WITNESS: If you're asking me -- actually, I'm not 6 sure what you're asking me. 7 THE COURT: I'm asking you what I'm asking you. you want the question put back? 8 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Andrew, please. 11 (Record read) 12 THE WITNESS: I would say, no, your Honor, because 13 tort recovery, if it's for foregone rental income, is going to 14 automatically reflect the replacement cost because the tort 15 recovery will be smaller because replacement cost has been -because the building owner has spent money on replacement cost. 16 17 The period during which the foregone rental income has suffered is shortened, so that tort damages will be lower, and 18 19 appropriately lower, when replacement costs are incurred.

THE COURT: But that's part of mitigation and we're allowing that in the recovery of the replacement cost in exchange for a shortened recovery of total stream income?

THE WITNESS: Correct.

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THE COURT: We start with a premise that the law tries to reimburse a person suffering from tort damages for the full

economic loss --

THE WITNESS: I understand that.

THE COURT: -- as of the date of the loss.

And we've posited that that total loss is the loss of the total stream of income. And we've posited that the insurance recovery for a certain portion of that term of that lost income stream corresponds to a portion of the lost income recovered in the form of damages. And now we're trying to figure out how to deal with that portion of the economic cost of restoring the income stream and to see if it corresponds to some aspect of the balance of the tort recovery. And that's where I'm probing.

THE WITNESS: If the -- if a party spends an amount of money on replacement, and let's say as a result there is a two-year period during which rental income is lost and there's a tort award for two years of lost rental income --

THE COURT: The tort award would be for the full amount of lost revenue?

THE WITNESS: You mean for 30 years?

THE COURT: A full year -- the whole thing, the full term. That's what's been lost and that's what's the damages, of course, less mitigation.

THE WITNESS: Well, I'm assuming that what's meant by a tort award for lost rental income is a tort award for actual sustained lost rental income, so, in this example, not for 30

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years but for two years. And if that's how tort damages are determined --

THE COURT: The even though what was lost is the full revenue stream of 30?

THE WITNESS: Well, what was -- it would be correct to say that what was lost was 30 years only in the notional sense, because if the building is --

THE COURT: In the real sense, that's how you measure damages; you measure the value of what's lost, and what's lost was a total income stream discounted to present value?

THE WITNESS: Well, if that is the measure of loss, then that measure would exceed the actual loss because it would be two years, in your example. So...

(Continued on next page)

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1	THE COURT: And the cost of restoration.
2	THE WITNESS: Yes. And the loss would include the
3	cost of restoration. So from an economics perspective, full
4	compensation to the victim of the loss would be the sum of two
5	numbers, the two-year lost rental income and the full amount of
6	the replacement cost. If you're saying I am
7	THE COURT: And then is there a correspondence between
8	both those costs, or both those economic factors, and the total
9	recovery?
10	THE WITNESS: No. If there were such a
11	correspondence, then a party who received tort damages for the
12	two years would not be made whole, because the issue would be a
13	set-off from that. But if the tort damages were more than
14	enough to compensate for the actual loss of rental income, the
15	story would be more complicated.
16	THE COURT: OK. I think I've got it.
17	Anybody else? Any more questions, Mr. Williamson?
18	MR. WILLIAMSON: No, your Honor. Thank you.
19	THE COURT: Any more questions, Mr. Podesta?
20	MR. PODESTA: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Professor Shavell, thank you so much.

THE WITNESS: You're welcome, your Honor.

THE COURT: It's been a pleasure to see you in action and be one end of the Socratic dialogue.

(Witness excused)

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All right, Mr. Williamson, what's next?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Two things. Your Honor had asked on the first day of trial that we prepare a summary of some of the amounts that were being identified in my opening. And you asked that we submit them in writing. We prepared that.

THE COURT: Good.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Together with a collection of slides that I used in the opening, in case your Honor wants any of them available. So we will make copies of those.

MR. PODESTA: Am I correct that the slides are being offered as demonstratives, not as evidence?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Right. So there's a record of what they were.

So the summaries are being offered and the slide is being marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 570.

Next, your Honor, we went through Mr. Reilly's report yesterday. Your Honor said to identify overnight if there were any passages that weren't characterized or summarized or read by your Honor that I wanted to raise with you today, and there were just a few. So I would like to follow up and complete that.

We'll get a clean copy again so that I could call your attention, if I may, to just the two passages. I'm told, your Honor, that you would have it as Joint Exhibit 1.

THE COURT: Just tell me what you want to add.

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MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. Thank you. Page 3, footnote 2. Can I read what it says?

THE COURT: 3.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you. Footnote 2. "WTCP also was insured for its own initial rent payments totaling \$491 million under its leases with the Port Authority (see sections 1.140, 1.142, and 5.1 of leases), but only if the Port Authority canceled the leases. See, for example, the leasehold interest coverage provisions of the WilProp form (attached as Exhibit R-3) and the Travelers form (exhibit R-4)." That's the end of that, your Honor.

Turning then to paragraph 8, at page 4, we would like to offer that, if I may read it.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you. Paragraph 8: "Unlike a commercial business, the typical homeowner does not need or have insurance for lost rental income. He insures only the value of his house. However, if the homeowner rents his home to tenants, in addition to buying insurance for damage to the home itself" --

THE COURT: I don't need that. That doesn't help me.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Continuing to page 7, your Honor, there were two sentences in different places. At the top of page 7, the sentence we would like to add is, "To my knowledge, there was no final adjustment and no -- and final proofs of

loss were unnecessary and were not required." And the other sentence would be, "Some expressly provided that payments were on an interim on-account basis and were 'subject to final adjustment.'"

And then the last one is at page 8, your Honor. And that's the last three sentences of paragraph 15, if I may read them.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WILLIAMSON: I know you touched on it yesterday, but the numbers are important for having the calculations that were just discussed.

THE COURT: We have these numbers in evidence.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Well, because it's based on this document that Professor Shavell was using these percentages and verifying all the calculations. So it's just these three sentences.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WILLIAMSON: "The other three preliminary proofs of partial losses, including supplements, are related to the \$7,183,441,908 replacement cost claims. Accordingly, business income/rental value claims accounted for only 15.8 percent of the total \$8,531,247,587 claimed in the preliminary proofs of partial losses. The replacement cost claim of \$7,183,441,908 represents 84.2 percent of the total." And I've omitted the footnotes.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor. With respect to the open question that we identified at the end yesterday about any remaining exhibits, having pared down as much as possible overnight even further the exhibits that are on the jointly agreed-to exhibit list, we would like to offer certain of them into evidence.

THE COURT: How many?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Ms. Baglin has the exact count.

MS. BAGLIN: I can go through them.

MR. WILLIAMSON: And then from the plaintiff's exhibit list, certain ones that have been culled and reduced to the ones that we would like to offer into evidence.

THE COURT: How many?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Ms. Baglin will do that. We've also proofed them so your Honor can see, you know, what are all of the same type.

MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, if I may begin, based on what was listed as having been received in evidence in the transcript of the last two days, I understand there was some confusion as to what came in and what did not come in. I would just like to clarify for the record that the transcripts show that the following exhibits have been received in evidence.

THE COURT: Please don't read it. If it's in the

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transcript, it's in the transcript.

MS. BAGLIN: In addition to that, your Honor yesterday had asked us if we could mark Exhibit 9 to Mr. Reilly's report as a separate exhibit so it can be used for the Court. We've done that.

THE COURT: That's received.

MS. BAGLIN: Joint Exhibit 1-A, your Honor, the Reilly Exhibit 9.

(Joint Exhibit 1-A's Exhibit 9 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: The next exhibit, your Honor, is one which is Plaintiff's Exhibit 571. It was referred to in the testimony the other day. Has Bates numbers --

THE COURT: Don't read the Bates numbers. Put it up, please.

MS. BAGLIN: While we're getting the technician, your Honor, I'll just remind you, it's the November 12, 2001 letter written by Mr. Emmerich to some of the insurers and the adjustors. And among other things, the letter alleges that the insurers were engaging in unconscionable delays in making payments. It also referred to some of the advances we discussed. We would offer that in evidence.

THE COURT: It's not relevant. I'm not accepting it.

MS. BAGLIN: Next, I just wanted to confirm, it's not referred to in the transcript that Professor Fischel's curriculum vitae, which Mr. Podesta offered as Defendant's

1 Exhibit E-4, is in evidence.

MR. PODESTA: I believe I moved it into evidence.

THE COURT: Received. If I didn't receive it before, I receive it now.

(Defendant's Exhibit E-4 received in evidence)

THE COURT: I think all the experts have their résumés in evidence.

MS. BAGLIN: Next, your Honor, we have some of the Joint Exhibits. These are exhibits as to which none of the parties have any objection. They've been mutually agreed to. We've been through all of them and pared down the list. The first one is Joint Exhibit 2. It is the proof preliminary proof of loss on the main site. And we offer in evidence —

THE COURT: I have all these proofs of law for 16 of them. Are we going to offer each of the 16?

MS. BAGLIN: No, your Honor. I was only offering this one as an exemplar primarily for the nonwaiver provision that was in there that was referred to in Mister --

THE COURT: I understand, without prejudice, non-waiver basis. No need to paper it up.

MS. BAGLIN: OK. The next exhibit which your Honor just asked that we put together and said you would expect a whole book, that's Joint Exhibit 5. And we have it here for you. It's actually not one book, your Honor. It is four books, book 1 of 4, 2 of 4. So we have labeled those, with

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counsel's consent, as Joint Exhibit 5A, B, C, D. And I would just point out to your Honor that it's book 4 or Exhibit JX-5B that pertains the provisions pertaining to depreciation that we discussed earlier today, and I would refer, because these are large exhibits, I would refer specifically to the page number WTCP 0019751.

THE COURT: What does that say?

MS. BAGLIN: That just tells what the depreciation methodology was. And then Section 28 --

THE COURT: Tell me, what was it?

MS. BAGLIN: It's what I described this morning, your Honor. Looking at the conditions and the useful life of the individual components of the rebuild -- that went into the rebuilt building.

THE COURT: Why don't you just offer that.

MS. BAGLIN: We've already all agreed to --

THE COURT: You have to understand that, with all the paper, you just increase the expenses of the field. If you reduce the papers to what's relevant, your field costs will be less.

MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, we believe that this particular exhibit is relevant. I'm just pointing out these particular pages for your Honor's convenience because you specifically discussed depreciation this morning.

THE COURT: Do I have to worry about any other papers?

MS. BAGLIN: The next exhibit --1 Do I have to worry about any other papers? 2 THE COURT: 3 MS. BAGLIN: Excuse me, your Honor? 4 THE COURT: Do I have to worry about any other pages? 5 MS. BAGLIN: Yes. Book 1, for example, you had asked 6 us for specifically. That contains the summary of the claim 7 which has all the different elements including --THE COURT: I understand that. We went over that. 8 9 MS. BAGLIN: It's followed by the Tishman replacement 10 cost budget on which some of the numbers are based. Then the 11 other books in there are the actual supporting documentation 12 for those books. 13 THE COURT: I accepted the volume, all four volumes. 14 You don't have to hand them up. 15 (Joint Exhibits 5A, 5B, 5C and 5D received in 16 evidence) 17 MS. BAGLIN: The next exhibits that we're offering into evidence, your Honor, are 14 settlement agreements as 18 Joint Exhibits 22 to 35. And I think we don't need to offer 19 20 them in evidence if the Court accepts without argument that 21 what the settlement agreements show is that the settlement 22 payment covered all claims or potential claims that could have 23 been brought under policies or under the coverage litigation, 24 that there was no allocation to any individual claim or

potential claim, and that the advance payments that were made

D7HAWTC3ps Shavell prior to the signing of the settlement agreements only became 1 2 final pursuant to terms of the settlement agreement. 3 THE COURT: I so accept. 4 MS. TAYLOR: Your Honor, we want to also note for the 5 record that certain of these settlement agreements specifically 6 indicate that it is being made on an actual cash value analysis 7 and in respect to the master redevelopment plan for the complex. So there is an indication on what the insurers were 8 9 contemplating in the payment.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. TAYLOR: And mutual releases as well.

MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, that is not the case with all the settlement agreements. If there is a dispute we would like to offer them in evidence.

THE COURT: Offer them all in evidence.

MS. BAGLIN: That's 22 through 35. Thank you.

MR. BYRNES: Your Honor, we suggest that you read through 37.

MS. BAGLIN: I was getting to those as a separate category because I thought we would have agreement on 22 through 35. I will turn now to Joint Exhibit 36, 37, and 45.

Exhibit 36, your Honor, is the Royal Indemnity Company insurance settlement payment. That's settled --

THE COURT: Received.

(Joint Exhibit 36 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: And the next one, 37, is the settlement 1 agreement with the foreign parent who had issued the policy. 2 3 THE COURT: Received. 4 (Joint Exhibit 37 received in evidence) 5 MS. BAGLIN: Exhibit 45 is the actual complaint 6 against the foreign parent showing what those claims were that 7 the lawsuit was about. 8 THE COURT: I'm not taking that. 9 MS. BAGLIN: The next two joint exhibits we'd offer in 10 evidence, your Honor, are 94 and 95. That's the appraisal, 11 stipulation, and order, and the partial determination on 12 replacement costs --13 THE COURT: Received. 14 MS. BAGLIN: -- as of December 31, 2006. That's the 15 one that did not include the tenant improvement component. Both of those exhibits we offer in evidence at this time. 16 17 THE COURT: Received. (Joint Exhibits 94 and 95 received in evidence) 18 19 THE COURT: Tell me about that again. 20 MS. BAGLIN: The appraisal stipulation and order 21 basically tells who the parties were, who the umpire was, who 22 the appraisers were, the issues to be determined. Joint 23 Exhibit 95 is a partial decision by the panel, what they had 24 determined as of December 31, 2006 on replacement cost.

shows that the values that they determined don't reflect total

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replacement cost value because they hadn't yet determined the replacement cost value of tenant improvements that were yet to be added. That was one of the next things they were going to And it says they specifically contemplated issuing a later award after those were determined.

Are those received in evidence, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BAGLIN: The next is Joint Exhibit 101. This is the 1 World Trade Center lease. I don't think there's any dispute that the leases for those four buildings, for 1, 2, 3, and 4, all have --

THE COURT: We call them 1, 2, 4, and 5. That's how they label them in the complaint.

MS. BAGLIN: Yes. The net leases for those four buildings all have the same pertinent provisions.

THE COURT: Received.

MS. BAGLIN: So rather than putting in all four leases we'll put in this one as representative.

THE COURT: Received.

MS. BAGLIN: Thank you.

(Joint Exhibit 101 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: The next exhibit is Joint Exhibit 203. That's the IRI adjustor's final claim report on the 7 World Trade Center claim.

> THE COURT: Received.

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(Joint Exhibit 203 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: Thank you. The next one is Joint Exhibit That's the settlement agreement between IRI and 7 World Trade Company.

THE COURT: Received.

(Joint Exhibit 205 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: The next one is Joint Exhibit 209. is the March 27, 2003 interim proof of partial losses for 7.

THE COURT: Received.

(Joint Exhibit 209 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: The next one, Joint Exhibit 214, is a March 18, 2003 letter from IRI to Mr. Levy that shows -- and this is relevant to Mr. Beach's opinion -- that IRI had not accepted any proof of loss at that time and didn't think that the insured had submitted proper documentation.

THE COURT: Why is that relevant?

MS. BAGLIN: Because Mr. Beach has testified that none of the insurance payments were made here except for a documented claim. And at that time the insurer hadn't accepted any claim and said it had received proper documentation. payments were made prior to this.

THE COURT: Received.

(Joint Exhibit 214 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: The next exhibit is Joint 215. It's a letter from Mr. Wolinsky to IRI dated March 20, 2003. And that D7HAWTC3ps

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is raising claims that IRI was acting in bad faith in the manner of handling its claims by engaging in dilatory payment tactics.

THE COURT: Why is that relevant?

MS. BAGLIN: It's relevant because we say, your Honor, that the settlement agreement, and the settlement agreements say, that they were settling all claims against the insurer. And this explains the nature of some of those extra-contractual claims against IRI.

THE COURT: Received.

MS. BAGLIN: The next is Joint Exhibit 224. the 7 World Trade Center.

THE COURT: Received.

(Joint Exhibit 224 received in evidence)

MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, we would like to offer a number of plaintiff exhibits. And only objection outstanding as to any of these from the aviation defendants are relevance objections. I don't know if there are any authentication objections or things like that. As a matter of fact, all of them except this first one were at one time on the Joint Exhibit list. So there really shouldn't be any objection.

The first one, though --

MR. PODESTA: I do have an objection generally to a document dump of plaintiffs' exhibits that have not been discussed in any of the live witnesses' testimony.

Shavell D7HAWTC3ps 1 THE COURT: Make your objections one by one, 2 Mr. Podesta. 3 MR. PODESTA: Fair enough. MS. BAGLIN: The first one that I would like to offer 4 is Plaintiff's Exhibit 501. That's the World Trade Center 5 6 offering memoranda with respect to the initial bidding. And we 7 offer that --8 THE COURT: You object, Mr. Podesta? 9 MR. PODESTA: Yes, I do. 10 THE COURT: Stenned. 11 MS. BAGLIN: Your Honor, may I point out that one of 12 the pages of that offering memoranda shows specifically that 13 there was a recent capital improvement program, that most of 14 the major systems in the complex were by then state of the art. 15 This relates to the depreciation factor we've already 16 discussed. 17 THE COURT: Objection sustained. MS. BAGLIN: Next we have a series of exhibits, your 18 Honor. These all relate to advances. This is Plaintiff's 19 20 Exhibit 511, 514, 515, 518, 519, 520, 522, 524, 526, 528, 536, 21 537, 542, 543, 546, 549, and 560. I think we can forgo 22 offering the actual exhibits if we have agreement here that the 23 advances paid by the insurers were all made without

THE COURT: I so understand.

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prejudice --

MS. BAGLIN: -- without characterization of the 1 advances or allocations to any potential coverages. 2 3 THE COURT: I so understand. 4 MS. BAGLIN: Next is Exhibit, Plaintiff's Exhibit 512, 5 your Honor. That is a December 4, 2001 letter from the 6 Hartford Insurance Company in which they make a \$32 million 7 advance payment under their current terms limits. That specifically states that the payment is not made with respect 8 9 to any particular element of loss. THE COURT: I so understand. But the exhibit is 10 declined. 11 12 MS. BAGLIN: Plaintiff's Exhibit 556, your Honor, is 13 an April 26, 2002 letter from Zurich, accompanying their 14 payment of their single --15 THE COURT: Same understanding. MS. BAGLIN: -- limit. 16 Thank you. 17 That's it, your Honor. Thank you. 18 THE COURT: Thank you very much. Anything else, Mr. Williamson? 19 20 MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor. You had asked 21 yesterday, we were discussing Joint Exhibit 95 in evidence of 22 partial decision by the appraisal panel regarding the value of 23 replacement costs, and it came up that tenant improvements were

not included because they hadn't reached it. Your Honor asked

for a breakdown building by building of the tenant improvement

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amounts that were claimed. We prepared that.

THE COURT: I did ask you that?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. And we can actually give you the transcript cite page and line.

THE COURT: No, no, if you say, I'll accept it.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes. So we said we would prepare it, my colleagues would prepare it for you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMSON: And they did. And they did the same for 7.

THE COURT: So what's the number?

MR. WILLIAMSON: So that would be Plaintiff's Exhibit 572 that we would like to hand up.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMSON: You're welcome. And then Plaintiff's Exhibit 573 takes those tenant improvement dollar amounts and adds them to the replacement cost column, so you have it all totaled for you, either whether you want the tenant improvements alone, Exhibit 572, or you want it added together. You can have it both ways.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Not from the plaintiffs' point of view, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Plaintiffs rest?

MR. WILLIAMSON: The aviation defendants would go

THE COURT: They already rested.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Plaintiffs rest. Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Any rebuttal, Mr. Podesta?

MR. PODESTA: Let me check with my of my colleagues.

We have no rebuttal case. We rest.

THE COURT: You rest. Both sides rest.

All right. We recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. We'll start closing arguments with Mr. Podesta, followed by Mr. Williamson. And if there's rebuttal by Mr. Podesta, each side is limited to one hour close.

MR. PODESTA: Thank you, your Honor. I will probably divide it 45, 15.

THE COURT: We'll do whatever you want. We'll keep track.

Thank you very much.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

(Adjourned to 10:00 a.m., July 18, 2013)

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